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Abstract
Turnout among young adults has declined steadily in various advanced industrial
democracies in recent decades. At the same time, as a consequence of delayed tran-
sitions to adulthood, many life-cycle events considered important for the development
of electoral participation are experienced later in life. These combined trends call for
a revaluation of the political life-cycle model and the way in which it explains voter
turnout among young adults. More specifically, in this paper it is argued that variation
in the timing of life events has been overlooked as an explanatory factor of genera-
tional differences in young adults’ propensity to turn out to vote. With accumulating
evidence that the decision to vote is to some extent habitual, a lack of life experi-
ences may cause young adults to form the habit to abstain rather than to vote. If
the mechanisms of the life-cycle model are indeed correct, later maturation should at
least partially explain why young adults these days are less inclined to vote than their
parents or grandparents in their younger years. Based on the British Election Studies
from 1964 to 2010 the findings of this study confirm generally observed patterns of a
delayed assumption of adult roles by young citizens. This trend toward later maturation
negatively affects turnout levels of young citizens. If maturation levels had remained
at pre-war levels, the average turnout among Britain’s post-seventies generation would
have been no less than 12 percentage points higher.
Keywords: Turnout; young adults; political life-cycle; generational differences; later
maturation.
Introduction
Although young adults have long been identified as a group of the electorate less
likely to vote, recent research suggests that turnout levels among young cohorts are
declining rapidly. This implies that today’s young adults turn out at lower levels than
their parents and grandparents did when they were young. Trends of declining young
adult turnout levels have been particularly well documented in Canada (Gidengil et al.,
2003; Pammett and LeDuc, 2003; Johnston et al., 2007), the United States (Levine
and Lopez, 2002; Lopez et al., 2005) and Great Britain (Phelps, 2004, 2006).1
Young voters grow into older voters. Unless turnout losses are made up as young
people age, the recently witnessed decline in turnout levels among young adults pre-
dicts lower general turnout levels in the future. According to the political life-cycle
argument young adults vote less than older citizens because they are faced with ‘start-
up’ problems: pre-occupations outside the political sphere that lead to low attachment
to civic life. In terms of the life-cycle theory, declining turnout patterns among young
adults suggest that today’s young people face more or extended start-up problems
than previous generations (Kimberlee, 2002; Flanagan et al., 2012). Indeed, delayed
transitions to adulthood are witnessed in almost all advanced industrial democracies
(Vogel, 2001; Iacovou, 2002; Nico, 2014).
This paper seeks to understand whether, and if so to which extent, delayed tran-
sitions to adulthood play a role in the observed patterns of declining turnout among
young adults. Combining elements of the life-cycle and the cohort/generation ap-
proaches to age differences in voter turnout, the later maturation hypothesis examines
1See Smets (2012, 2013) for an overview of trends in young adult turnout and the age gap in
voter turnout in ten advanced industrial democracies.
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the idea that the timing of life events that are considered important for the develop-
ment of electoral participation varies between generations. Since key events such as
leaving school, starting a first job, getting married and forming a family are gradually
taking place at a higher average age, the trend towards later maturation should be able
to explain part of the turnout decline among young voters. More sharply put: if the
movement of life-cycle events to a higher average age does not translate into changes
in turnout patterns of young people, we have serious reasons to doubt the over-time
validity of the life-cycle model.
The relationship between (later) maturation and young adult voter turnout is as-
sessed in two ways. First a maturation index based on six basic socio-demographic
indicators that mark the transition to adulthood is used. Analyses with the separate
life-cycle events, secondly, allow a peek into the black box of the effect of age on voter
turnout. Empirical research of individual-level voter turnout often uses age as a proxy
for the respondent’s life-cycle stage and it is on the whole a significant explanatory
factor of voter turnout (see Smets and van Ham, 2013). Yet, from an empirical point
of view, we know relatively little about why turnout increases as citizens age and even
less about how the relationship between age and turnout changes with time.
Empirical analyses based on the British Election Studies from 1964 to 2010 sup-
port the general observation that the proportion of young adults that has experienced
consequential life-cycle events has decreased over-time. As expected, maturation is a
strong, stable, and significant predictor of individual level turnout among young voters.
Combining these two insights, later maturation can be linked to declining turnout levels
among younger voters. Had there been no delays in the transition to adulthood since
the pre-war generation experienced its young adulthood years, turnout among Britain’s
post-seventies generation would have been 53% instead of 41%: a 12 percentage point
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difference. These findings are particularly relevant in light of the present-day economic
crisis, which causes additional hurdles in the transition to adulthood for the current
generation of young adults.
Focussing on separate life-cycle events instead of an index of maturation, moreover,
brings to light the differential impact of various life-cycle events on young adult turnout.
As expected the maturation index explains away the effect of age on voter turnout;
however, not all life-cycle indicators perform as expected. Home ownership, marriage
and cohabitation are found to have a consistent positive effect on turnout. Contrary to
theoretical expectations of the life-cycle model, leaving education negatively influences
turnout of young adults. The same is true for childbearing; however, the variable
does not reach statistical significance in a plurality of the models. Having a job and
residential stability, while positively related to young adult voter turnout, also do not
reach statistical significance.
Later maturation and turnout decline among young
adults
The impressionable or formative years between childhood and adulthood are gen-
erally believed to be a crucial period during which citizens form the basis of political
attitudes and behaviours (see e.g. Jennings, 1979; Strate et al., 1989; Highton and
Wolfinger, 2001; Kinder, 2006). Young citizens have not yet developed political habits
and are, therefore, more easily influenced by external factors (Alwin and Krosnick,
1991; Flanagan and Sherod, 1998; Sears and Levy, 2003). Social, cultural, political
and historical changes affect young citizens disproportionally thus creating generational
differences in turnout patterns.
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One way in which today’s young adults differ decisively from young adults of the
past seems to have been systematically overlooked in the empirical literature.2 Young
citizens nowadays grow into their adult roles – defined in terms of a set of social
qualifiers rather than in terms of psychological development (see Mary, 2014 on this
distinction) – at a different pace than their parents or grandparents did when they were
young. To understand how such later maturation is tied to declining levels of young
adult voter turnout we need to consider the life-cycle approach of political participation.
According to the life-cycle argument of political behaviour, young people partici-
pate less in politics given their low attachment to civic life: a characteristic that is
fuelled by young people still going through education, being occupied with finding a
partner, establishing a career, having higher mobility, dealing with the psychological
transformation into adulthood, etc. These characteristics lead young people to be
politically inexperienced and to have little interest in politics, low levels of knowledge
and fewer skills (i.e. to have few political resources). This, in turn, makes electoral
participation both more difficult and less meaningful in this first stage of the life-cycle
(Strate et al., 1989; Jankowski and Strate, 1995).
In middle life, turnout rates are thought to stabilise at a higher level as people
experience life-cycle events that mark the transition to adulthood. Such events include
leaving the parental home, starting a full-time job, cohabiting or getting married, buying
a house, starting a family, settling down in a community, etc. Even though many of
these processes put a demand on time, they are associated with activities (involvement
in organizations, associations, the community, etc.) that tend to enhance turnout due
to increased mobilisation, skills, and pressure (Strate et al., 1989, 444, Lane, 1959,
218, Kinder, 2006). As stakeholders, home owners are more likely to be interested in
2For a theoretical discussion see Kimberlee (2002) and Flanagan et al. (2012)
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property tax and mortgages. To those with (full time) jobs issues such as pensions
and income tax become relevant (Flanagan et al., 2012). As a result the transition to
adulthood increases attention to and familiarity with parties’ and candidates positions,
which in turn fosters party attachment and other forms of political engagement. All
in all, the middle-aged seem to have the best cards to understand politics and their
part in it (Jankowski and Strate, 1995, 91), which is most likely the reason why this
stage of the political life-cycle is often used as a base against which to compare the
political participation levels of younger and older citizens (Braungart and Braungart,
1986, 210).
Participation rates among older age groups, finally, tend to drop under the influence
of, for example, health problems, the loss of a politically active spouse, retirement, and
declining family income. Summarizing, it is the more general disengagement from social
life that leads to a lower attachment to political life (Cutler and Bengtson, 1974, 163).
So far, the political life-cycle has mostly been conceived a static curvilinear re-
lationship between age and voter turnout. However, we do not know whether the
life-cycle of political participation really exists, or whether its shape differs across time
and space.3 With accumulating evidence that the decision to vote is to some extent
habitual (Green and Shachar, 2000; Kanazawa, 2000; Plutzer, 2002; Bendor et al.,
2003; Gerber et al., 2003; Cutts et al., 2009; Aldrich et al., 2011; Dinas, 2012), a lack
of life experiences may cause young adults to form the habit to abstain rather than to
vote.
Based on findings in the sociological and demographic literature as well as circum-
stantial evidence, it seems plausible to reason that the political life-cycle of today’s
3What we do know is that the curvilinear relationship with age does not seem to hold for all
modes of political participation (see e.g. Stolle and Hooghe, 2011).
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young adults is not similar to the initial stage of the life-cycle of their parents or
grandparents. Higher educational levels have resulted in young adults staying in school
longer, having extended co-habitation with – as well as longer financial dependence
on – their parents, and postponed full entry onto the labour market. Moreover, the
average age of marriage has risen and childbearing is increasingly postponed (see Pirie
and Worcester, 1998; Billari and Wilson, 2001; European Commission, 2001; Billari
and Kohler, 2002; Furstenberg, Jr. et al., 2003; Kennedy, 2004; OECD, 2007). Seem-
ingly facing more and/or extended start-up problems than young people of previous
generations, turnout patterns of today’s young adults are expected to have been neg-
atively affected. Variation in the timing of life events has thus far been overlooked as
an explanatory factor of generational differences in young adults’ propensity to turn
out to vote. The later maturation hypothesis, moreover, provides an explanation as to
why contemporary young people are often found to be less interested, more alienated
and more disengaged from the political system.
Life-cycle events and their impact on young adult voter turnout
Notwithstanding decennia of references to the life-cycle model in the literature, rela-
tively little is known about the influence that each possible life event has on individuals’
levels of turnout. The acquisition of an ‘adult role’ is what ties together the life events
that mark the transition from the first to the middle life-cycle stage. Leaving edu-
cation is one of the first steps towards entering the adult world. Being in education,
from a theoretical perspective, thus, is seen as a first stage life-cycle characteristic: a
start-up problem that causes these citizens to be too pre-occupied with externalities
to become involved in political affairs (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Strate et al.,
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1989; Jankowski and Strate, 1995; Highton and Wolfinger, 2001). Empirical research
paints a different picture, however. Studies that have researched the effect of ‘being
in education’ on individual level turnout, find a positive and significant relationship
between the two variables (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Highton and Wolfinger,
2001; Sandell Pacheco and Plutzer, 2007; Tenn, 2007). An explanation for this finding
is that young people who are still in school find themselves in a much more stimulating
environment than their non school-going peers. Since theory and empirical findings are
contradicting, the direction of the hypothesized effect of leaving education on turnout
can be twofold.
At some point after leaving education most people leave the parental home (Elder,
1985). Some take up temporary residence in the city where they study, others settle
down more permanently. Not many studies have focussed on the effect of leaving
the parental home on turnout. From an adult role perspective, leaving the parental
home should foster turnout. Highton and Wolfinger (2001), nonetheless, find turnout
among young people who left the parental home to be lower than among those who
had not taken the adult step of moving out. Controlling for confounding factors such as
residential stability (discussed in more detail below), the relationship between leaving
the parental home and turnout was, however, found positive.
Settling down in a community goes hand in hand with residential stability. Students
in particular are not tied to one place (see Squire et al., 1987 for a breakdown of the
characteristics of movers and stayers).This is especially problematic in countries where
electoral registration is the responsibility of the voter (Highton, 2000; Highton and
Wolfinger, 2001). The need to constantly re-register is a burden that often leads
citizens to abstain from voting. Home ownership, just like residential stability, is
considered to strengthen community ties (Lane, 1959; Jankowski and Strate, 1995).
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After leaving school getting a job is often the next step toward assuming adult
roles (Lane, 1959; Elder, 1985; Jankowski and Strate, 1995). The work environment is
considered a place of political socialization in various ways – both direct and indirect
(Sigel, 1989; Brady et al., 1995). Certain jobs bring citizens directly in touch with
socio-political issues. Having a job, secondly, puts certain demands on citizens (e.g.
time-consciousness, punctuality, ability to follow written instructions, etc.). Moreover,
certain occupations come with a certain status. This status brings with it a diversity of
resources, skills, knowledge and prestige that are also useful for electoral participation.
The work environment is also considered to influence political interest because workers
are often organised in unions which inform their members and mobilise them to protest
against unpopular measures. These mobilization efforts can trigger interest in socio-
political issues. On the whole, having a job is therefore expected to boost turnout.
Marriage and starting a family are also positively related to turnout in the long
run (Elder, 1975, 1985). While Stoker and Jennings (1995) find that the transition to
married life initially has a disruptive effect on political participation levels, in the mid to
long term being married is generally found to be positively correlated to participation.
Partners can learn from and influence each other, and a politically active spouse is
likely to motivate and mobilise his or her partner. Denver (2008) argues that married
citizens adhere to more traditional values. This may lead married people to be more
likely to conform to the idea of ‘good citizenship’ and to consider voting and political
engagement a civic duty. In this paper marriage and cohabitation are treated as
one. Both social and legal boundaries between cohabitation and marriage are fuzzy
(Thornton et al., 2007). Moreover, the practical and beneficial consequences of living
with a partner are present in a similar fashion among cohabiting and married couples.
Childbearing, lastly, increases the awareness of social needs, such as education, health
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care, and playgrounds, as well as the responsibility to perform as a citizen model (Lane,
1959). Parents of school-going children are likely to become part of social networks
that mobilize them into collective action (Flanagan et al., 2012). While those with
young children can be expected to have little time on their hands, parenthood is
often interpreted as a sign of stability, and therefore, stronger links to the community
(see Anderson, 2009 for an empirical study of the relation between being part of a
community and voter turnout).
Data
The aim of this paper is to assess the extent to which later maturation affects gener-
ational differences in voter turnout. First, we need to establish whether generational
differences in the transition to adulthood can indeed be observed. Second, we have
to assess to which extent generational differences in patterns of political maturation
influence generational turnout patterns of young adults. Panel data following the same
respondents over time are best suited to study the effect of transitions to adulthood
on voter turnout (Hooghe, 2004; Glenn, 2005; Hobbs et al., 2014). However, to study
generational differences a long time span is essential. To my knowledge there are no
panel data available that contain the relevant indicators and are composed of sufficient
waves to allow for a large time dimension. I, therefore, rely on the best alternative to
assess my hypotheses: repeated cross-sectional election surveys. Compared to elec-
tion surveys in other advanced industrial democracies the British Election Studies from
1964 to 2010 are much more inclusive when it comes to the over-time measurement of
life-cycle events that mark the transition to adulthood. For the purpose of this study
ideally we would like to know whether respondents are in education, whether they have
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a partner, have a full-time job, live away from their parents, have stable residence, and
own their own home. Only an indicator keeping track of whether a respondent left the
parental home or not is missing from the British Election Studies.
The dependent variable in the analyses presented below is reported turnout in the
last general election. The key independent variables in all models are events marking
the transition to adulthood. They are measured as dichotomous variables where a ’1’
indicates that the respondent has made the transition.
A question asking after the respondent’s marital status was used to create a dummy
variable identifying those respondents who were either married or cohabiting with their
partner. A measurement of the respondent’s job status was used to identify the re-
spondents with a (full-time) job.
The variable ‘left education’ is based on a question asking the respondent’s age
when leaving (full-time) education. In some instances, a separate category was included
for those still in education. For the earlier election years the question concerning the
age at which the respondent left education referred to primary or secondary education
only. In these instances, a proxy was calculated based on the age and educational
level of the respondent. For all respondents with a post-secondary educational level,
three years were added to the age the respondent left secondary education. Three is
the minimum number of years it takes to complete a bachelor degree in Great Britain
and the measure, although not optimal, is a conservative estimate of the period a
respondent was in post-secondary education. If a respondent was younger than the
computed school leaving age or had an age equal to it, he or she was considered to
still be in education.4
4No respondents were identified as being in education in 1964 and 1966. This is not as peculiar
as it may seem at first sight. In the 1964 and 1966 elections the minimum voting age in Great Britain
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Whether a respondent has children was only asked in the earlier election studies. In
subsequent years, instead, the number of young people in the household was enquired
after. Usually, the threshold was put at the age of 18 years, but in two instances the
question referred to young people aged less than 16 (1987) or less than 15 (1983)
years. When dealing with young respondents, it is impossible to distinguish between
siblings and own children with a question phrased this way. To avoid this mix-up,
only children in the household of married, cohabiting, divorced, widowed, or separated
respondents where counted as being the respondent’s own. No references to children
are available for the February 1974 and 1992 elections.
A variable tapping home ownership was derived from a question asking the respon-
dent whether their home was owned or rented. The home ownership variable was not
included in the election survey of 1966. A measure of residential stability of respon-
dents, lastly, is based on a question asking the respondent after the number of years
he or she lived in the neighbourhood or area. This question was missing from the 1983
and 1992 election studies and was only posed to two-thirds of the respondents in 2001.
A respondent is considered to have residential stability when he or she has lived in the
same place for three or more years.5 However, there is one problem with these last
two measures. An 18-year old who has lived with her/his parents since birth is likely
to live in an owned home and have residential stability. Neither scenario has much to
do with maturation. As a filter, respondents who are in education and indicate to live
in an owned home or to live in their neighbourhood for a long time are set to zero on
was still 21 years. This age threshold is most likely what accounts for the lack of respondents in
education in these two election years.
5Since the variable measuring residential stability was categorical in 1964, 1966 and 1970 the
cut-off was placed at 2 years in these election years.
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the home ownership and residential stability variables. This filter should at the very
least improve the measurement of home ownership and residential stability.
The six dichotomous life-cycle indicators available in the British Election Studies
from 1964 to 2010 – having left education, being married or cohabiting, having children,
owning a home, long residential stability and having a job – are combined in an additive
’maturation index’.6 As such, the maturation index is a seven-point scale ranging from
0 to 6 where a higher score indicates a higher level of maturation.
Some of the models presented below also include control variables: gender, ed-
ucational level, union membership, strength of partisanship, the perceived difference
between political parties, turnout in the previous elections and the margin of the vic-
tory. The first four variables are expected to boost turnout as they are linked to the
socio-economic, mobilization and psychological models of turnout. The rationale for
including perceived differences between parties is linked to the rational choice model.
If differences are small, turnout is expected to be lower. The margin of the victory is
the simple difference in the vote share between the first and second placed parties at
the national level. The smaller the difference, the more competitive the election. High
stake elections generally attract more voters. Turnout in previous elections, lastly, is
a measure of the habitual nature of voter turnout whereby previous behaviour is a
predictor of current behaviour. Descriptive statistics and value labels for all variables
are presented in Appendix A.
As indicated above not all indicators of interest are available in all election years.
Because this missing data problem affects the robustness of the results, missing values
have been replaced through a multiple imputation method. Multiple imputation meth-
6Different indexes were constructed. The choice for a six-item index is prompted by theoretical
arguments discussed above. Moreover, a maturation index consisting of the six items proposed yields
the largest Cronbach’s α (.499).
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ods replace missing values by a list of m>1 simulated values and produces m plausible
alternative versions of the data set. Each of the m data sets is estimated in the same
fashion by a complete data method. The estimates of parameters of interest in the
m data sets are averaged to give a single estimate. The main advantage of multiple
imputation is that it yields a constant sample size over all models. The imputation
process is described in detail in online appendix C. All analyses presented in the next
two sections are based on the imputed data sets. The data have, moreover, been
adjusted for sampling errors and over-reporting of turnout.7 Lastly, in order facilitate
comparison all variables were standardized to vary between 0 and 1.
A comparison of the political life-cycle of different
generations
As a first step we need to establish whether generational differences in levels of
maturation can indeed be observed. There are various suggestions to this in the
literature; however, most empirical research focuses on one or two life-cycle indicators
at a time. In this section a broader overview of over-time changes in life-cycle indicators
will be presented. All analyses focus on a young subset of the electorate aged 35 years or
less. The crucial ‘impressionable years’ are often situated between the ages of seventeen
and twenty-five (Jennings and Niemi, 1981). Nonetheless, both a clear definition and
operationalisation are lacking and political learning is certainly not confined to these
7Self-reported turnout is affected by problems such as recall bias and social desirability (Bernstein
et al., 2001; Karp and Brockington, 2005). For this reason reported turnout tends to have an upward
bias when compared to data on actual turnout. The weights used for the analysis are computed
by dividing the official turnout rate in a given year by the BES reported turnout for that year with
design weights applied. This procedure adjusts the overall levels of turnout in each year and allows
calculation of generation-specific turnout rates under the assumption that response and reporting bias
is evenly distributed among all generations. For an identical approach see e.g. Franklin (2004) and
Fieldhouse et al. (2007).
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early adulthood years. Recent research by Bhatti and Hansen (2012b) suggests that
turnout drops after the first voting experience at the age of 18 and that only by the
age of 35 citizens return to their first-time turnout levels. Moreover, the theoretical
expectation is that life-cycle events experienced during early adulthood influence the
development of political interest and political participation. Delays in the transition to
adulthood imply that defining the group of young adults too narrowly entails to miss
out on a number of important life-cycle changes (Iacovou, 2002; Council of Europe,
2005).
To investigate generational differences in the assumption of adult roles, the average
scores (in percentages) on the maturation index were plotted by decade for young
adults of five generations. Following Blais et al. (2004), Wass (2007), and Bhatti
and Hansen (2012a) I have used the distinction between the pre-war generation (born
before 1944), the baby boomers (1945–1959), the 1960s generation (1960–1969), the
1970s generation (1970–1979) and the post-1970s generation (born in 1980 or later).
Figure 1 tracks the average scores on the maturation index for those aged 18 to 20,
21 to 25, 26 to 30 and those aged 31 to 35 whereby each line represents a different
generation.
Figure 1 looks at the generational differences in the transition to adulthood for
different age groups. (Note that the earliest election surveys did not include respon-
dents under the age of 21 as they were not allowed to vote.) As expected, the older
the respondent, the higher the score on the maturation index. Generational differences
are largest for the youngest age group with a 20 percentage point gap between the
maturation scores of 18 to 20 year olds of the sixties generation compared to the post-
seventies generation. Generational differences are smaller in the oldest two age groups
(26-30 and 31-35 years), which implies that while maturation levels of the youngest
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citizens these days are much lower than those of previous generations, these genera-
tional differences do seem to even out to some extent by the time citizens arrive in
their mid-thirties.
<FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE >
<FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE >
The lines in Figure 2, on the other hand, track the average scores on the six
life-cycle indicators from one generation to the next. It shows that the percentage
of young adults who have left education, are married and have children has declined
steadily and drastically between the pre-war generation and the post-seventies gener-
ation. The 1960s generation scores highest for having a job, residential stability and
home ownership by the age of 35. Young adults of the post-seventies generation score
lower than the pre-war generation on these three items, however.
Based on the findings in this section we can conclude that the political life-cycle
has indeed changed over-time and it has done so in the expected direction. Overall,
young adults nowadays mature at a different pace than their parents and grandparents
did. Today’s young adults have lower starting levels of maturation. Even though some
of the losses are made up as citizens age over-time differences remain apparent and
young adults are found to experience ever fewer life events with each election year that
passes. The next step is to assess the extent to which the delayed assumption of adult
roles is linked to generational differences in voter turnout.
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Later maturation and young adult turnout: an empir-
ical test
Although national election surveys are designed to include a representative sample
of the electorate as a whole, subsequent analyses will be performed on a young subset
of the electorate only (aged 35 years or less). There are several reasons for doing
so. First, the aim of this research is to understand what makes the turnout patterns
of today’s young adults different from young adults of the past. Second, the later
maturation hypothesis central to this study applies to young voters and abstainers
only. Although the hypothesis assumes that certain life-cycle events are experienced
later in life, which may suggest increasing the upper age bound, the more important
assumption is that the proportion of young citizens that has matured by a certain age
has decreased with time because of more or extended ‘start-up’ problems: a finding
that was corroborated in the previous section.
The analyses of young adult turnout presented in Table 1 consist of five steps. In
the first step, a model is estimated including only age and the dichotomous variables
for the different generations (see Model 1). The pre-war generation is the reference
category and is therefore not included in the model. As expected, the age variable is
positive and significant at the p<.05 level. The coefficients for the seventies and post-
seventies are negative and significant implying that the propensity to vote for young
adults of these generations is significantly smaller than for the pre-war generation.
<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE >
In a second step the maturation index is added to the model. The relationship
between the index variable and turnout is expected to be positive: the higher the
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level of maturation, the higher the probability that a respondent will turn out to vote.
This is indeed the case as is evidenced by the positive and significant coefficient for
the maturation index in Model 2 of Table 1. The coefficient for the age variable
should become smaller once the life-cycle indicators are included in the model. The
life-cycle model predicts that turnout increases with age as age increases the likelihood
of experiencing certain life-cycle events that are important for the development of
turnout patterns. Controlling for such events should therefore reduce the impact of
the variable age itself. Upon the inclusion of the maturation index in Model 2, we find
that the effect of age disappears completely. The magnitude of the generation effects
for the seventies and post-seventies generation appears, moreover, somewhat reduced
compared to Model 1.
The third model involves the inclusion of interactions between the generational
dummy variables and the maturation index. The inclusion of these interaction effects
assesses the extent to which maturation has the same impact on voter turnout for
young adults belonging to different generations. As can been seen in Model 3 of
Table 1 the impact of maturation is equal for young voters of all generations except for
those belonging to the post-seventies generation. The impact of political maturation
on voter turnout is smaller for today’s young adults than for young adults of the pre-war
generation in a model that does not include control variables.
In Model 4 these control variables are added to the model. Gender does not reach
statistical significance, but the other variables are statistically significant and in the
expected direction with the exception of perceived differences between parties. Larger
perceived differences appear to confuse the voter and lead to lower turnout levels. More
interesting, the impact of maturation on voter turnout does not disappear in a better
specified model even if the magnitude of the coefficient does decrease slightly. The
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interaction effect between the post-seventies generation and maturation is no longer
significant after the inclusion of the control variables.
In the final model of Table 1 a variable that measures the average turnout of older
voters (aged 36 years or more) is added to the model. This variable is a constant for a
given election year. Through the inclusion of the average turnout of older voters, we
can take account of the differences between younger and older voters (see Fieldhouse
et al., 2007 for a similar approach). If significant, this variable shows us that young
citizen’s turnout is partly a function of processes that are going on in the electorate
at large. Including the average turnout of older voters, moreover, makes it possible to
establish whether life-cycle changes influence turnout among young voters regardless
of other factors that influence turnout levels in the electorate at large. The average
turnout of older voters is significant and positive, implying that the turnout levels of
younger and older voters move in conjunction in Great Britain. The standardized co-
efficients, moreover, show that the impact of unmeasured societal processes have the
most substantial impact on young adult voter turnout. This notwithstanding matura-
tion remains a positive and significant explanatory factor of young adult voter turnout
in a fully specified model.
In terms of model fit the maturation index in itself does not do a good job a
explaining variation in young adult voter turnout. The pseudo R2 of Model 2 in which
the index was first included is a meagre .03. This result is not in the least surprising. In
their meta-analysis of individual-level voter turnout Smets and van Ham (2013) found
that no less than 177 different explanatory had empirically been linked to turnout
in journal articles published in the last decade. In other words, if there is a single
determinant of voter turnout it seems like we have not yet found it. This is also
reflected when looking at the model fit of Model 5 which includes most explanatory
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factors. Here the pseudo R2 reaches .16, which is decent for an individual level model
but still leaves a lot of room for improvement.
One of the questions that remains unanswered is what would have happened to
young adult voter turnout had maturation levels remained stable through time. Figure 3
shows the reported and predicted probabilities of turnout by generation had maturation
levels remained constant at the pre-war level (68%), while holding all other variables
at their (generational) mean. The difference between observed and predicted levels
of turnout is +2% for the baby boom generation, +3% for the sixties generation,
a difference of +4% for the seventies generation, and a difference of +12% for the
post-seventies generation. Delayed transitions to adulthood thus certainly play a role
in the low attraction that elections have on young adults these days.8
<FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE >
As a last step, it is worth looking into the black box of the maturation index.
Until now we have assumed that all life-cycle events have an equal impact on young
adult voter turnout. Table 2 shows models similar to those in Table 1 this time
including the separate life-cycle events rather than the maturation index. There is one
problem, however. Since respondents belonging to the post-seventies generation have
hardly experienced any life-cycle events, there are too few observations taking a ’1’
8Figure 3 reports the predicted probabilities of turnout for all five generations based on pre-
war maturation levels while holding all other variables at their generational average. The smaller
differences between the reported and predicted turnout for the pre-war, baby boom, sixties and
seventies generation could theoretically be based on the fact that the average age for these generations
is higher (21.9 years for the post-seventies generation versus an average of 27.3 years for the other
generations). To assess whether the findings for the post-seventies generation in Figure 3 are related to
the life-cycle stage in which these respondents find themselves (i.e. the fact that they are younger),
the predicted probabilities were also calculated while keeping maturation at the pre-war level and
age at the post-seventies level. The results are almost identical to those reported in Figure 3. The
robustness check yields the following differences between observed and predicted turnout levels: post-
war generation +4%, baby boom generation +2%, sixties generation +3%, seventies generation +4%,
post-seventies generation +12%.
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for the interaction effects between the life-cycle events and this particular generation.
Interactions with the post-seventies generation are therefore not modelled.9
<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE >
Starting with the impact of the life-cycle events, being married, cohabiting or being
a home owner are consistently linked to higher turnout levels. Having left education
is also a significant predictor of turnout, but not in the expected way. The coefficient
is negative in all models, indicating that those in education are actually more likely to
vote than those who left their formative years behind them. Although contradictory
to the life-cycle hypothesis, these results are in line with the research of other scholars
who find a similar positive relationship between being in education and turnout (see
e.g. Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Highton and Wolfinger 2001; Sandell Pacheco
and Plutzer 2007 and Tenn 2007). Those in school find themselves in a much more
stimulating environment, are more likely to discuss politics with peers and in some
instances are also engaged through the formal curriculum (e.g. social science students).
Hence the positive relationship between being in education and voter turnout. While
not statistically significant at the p<.05 level, having children is likewise found to
negatively impact turnout among young adults in the more fully specified models. It
is, of course, not a far stretch to assume that having small children leaves little room
for political engagement. Residential stability and having a job are positively correlated
with voter turnout but lose statistical significance once control variables are added to
the model.
9As a robustness check the models were also ran with the separate life-cycle events and interactions
with the maturation index (which is after all composed of all six life-cycle events). The results
are presented in Appendix B. None of the interaction effects with generation reaches statistical
significance.
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In comparison with the maturation index models, more significant differences in
generational turnout patterns can be observed in Table 2. However, in terms of the
interactions between life-cycle events and generations we find very few significant ef-
fects. Due to space reasons only significant interactions are shown in the table. We
see that the coefficients for having children, being married and having left education
are significant for the baby boom generation. However, in all cases the sign is opposite
from that for the pre-war generation which is the reference category. The two effects
thus almost cancel each another out. This implies that on the whole the effect of
life-cycle events on voter turnout is the same for young adults of all generations.
In terms of model fit, lastly, there are not many differences with the maturation
index models. The most fully specified model explains 16% of the variation in young
adult turnout.
Conclusion and discussion
According to the life-cycle theory, turnout increases as citizens age and experience
life-cycle events that coincide with the transition to adulthood. These life-cycle events
are thought to facilitate voter turnout. Findings in the sociological and demographic
literature, as well as circumstantial evidence, suggest that in the past decades many
life-cycle events have moved to a higher average age. In other words, young adults
these days experience fewer life-cycle events than their parents and grandparents did
when they were young. If the mechanisms of the life-cycle model are correct, these
generational differences in the transition to adulthood should be able to explain – at
least in part – why turnout in advanced industrial democracies has declined steadily
among young adults in recent decades.
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Based on the British Elections Studies from 1964 to 2010 this research shows
how levels of political maturation have declined from one generation to the next. An
index of six life-cycle events (having left education, being married or cohabiting, having
children, owning a home, long residential stability and having a job) is found to have
a positive and significant effect on young citizens’ turnout even when modelled with
other covariates of turnout. Had average levels of maturation remained constant since
the pre-war generation faced young adulthood, turnout levels of the post-seventies
generations would have been 12 percentage points higher.
While these results boost our confidence in the mechanisms of the political life-
cycle model, not all life-cycle indicators were found to have an equal impact on young
adult turnout. Home ownership and being married or cohabiting were found to have the
expected impact on turnout. Leaving education, on the other hand, had an unexpected
impact on turnout among young adults. While the life-cycle model considers leaving
education to be a sign of maturation it actually leads to lower instead of higher turnout
levels. This finding is in line with previous research. Students are most likely more
easily mobilized to participate in politics than their non-school going peers. Residential
stability, having a job, and childbearing were not found to pass the test of statistical
significance in a more fully specified model.
Concluding, there does not seem to be any reason to doubt the over-time validity
of the life-cycle model. Generational differences in the transition to adulthood explain
part of the generational differences in turnout among young adults. Previous research
has overlooked to link this societal trend to patterns of declining young adult turnout in
advanced industrial democracies. This study can be seen as a follow-up on earlier work
in which the link between later maturation and turnout was assessed at the aggregate
level (Smets, 2012).
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The later maturation hypothesis provides an intuitive explanation as to why young
adults are often found to be less interested, more disengaged and more alienated from
the political system. Not having made the transition to adulthood, turnout seems
more difficult and less meaningful for the current generation of young adults. While
the results of this study can only speak for the impact of later maturation on voter
turnout, it would be interesting to see whether a link with declining participation in
other forms of political action can be established as well. Depending on data availability
it would, moreover, be interesting to see whether a link between later maturation and
declining turnout among young adults can be found beyond Great Britain. From a
theoretical perspective there are no reasons why this would not be the case. Young
adult turnout has declined in almost all advanced industrial democracies and diversified
life-trajectories and delayed transitions to adulthood are observed in these countries as
well.
While later maturation is found to negatively impact turnout among young voters,
the models with the separate life-cycle events do show that more research is necessary
to understand the exact mechanisms of the life-cycle models. The negative impact
of some indicators suggests that their relationship with young adult turnout may be
curvilinear rather than linear. In other words, transitions may have an initial disruptive
effect on voter turnout before becoming a positive influence in the mid to long term.
Also, while not all variables behave as expected, taken together they do have a positive
impact on turnout. It seems that political maturation entails more than just a collection
of life-cycle events. Their collective strength seems to outnumber the performance of
the individual components.
The findings of this research also have potential policy implications. While it is
difficult for governments to influence the pace of maturation in broad terms, assisting
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young citizens to become stable and independent earlier in life would have a positive
impact on young adults’ turnout levels. Tackling youth unemployment, assistance for
first-time home buyers, and sufficient childcare facilities are examples of measures that
would facilitate the transition to adulthood for young citizens and increase their levels
of political engagement. In this sense, the current economic crisis, which puts young
Europeans in an exceptionally precarious situation, does not bode well for future levels
of voter turnout.
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model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5
b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se)
Age 0.399** 0.088 0.057 -0.339* -0.097
(0.184) (0.184) (0.195) (0.186) (0.171)
Baby boom generation -0.104 -0.094 -0.091 -0.274 -0.174
(0.109) (0.114) (0.246) (0.218) (0.220)
Sixties generation -0.253 -0.226 0.062 -0.175 -0.031
(0.185) (0.179) (0.403) (0.416) (0.396)
Seventies generation -0.738*** -0.673*** -0.279 -0.169 0.085
(0.213) (0.222) (0.361) (0.369) (0.299)
Post-seventies generation -1.024*** -0.917*** -0.235 -0.239 0.428
(0.226) (0.223) (0.379) (0.417) (0.523)
Maturation index 0.803*** 1.229*** 0.793** 0.742**
(0.164) (0.420) (0.387) (0.369)
Maturation * Baby boom 0.034 0.192 0.105
(0.458) (0.373) (0.354)
Maturation * Sixties -0.399 0.093 0.129
(0.653) (0.611) (0.578)
Maturation * Seventies -0.580 -0.308 -0.031
(0.505) (0.459) (0.418)
Maturation * Postseventies -1.329*** -0.632 -0.703
(0.478) (0.513) (0.518)
Gender -0.129* -0.125*
(0.074) (0.075)
Educational level 0.676*** 0.664***
(0.150) (0.147)
Union membership 0.185** 0.182**
(0.091) (0.090)
Strength of party id 1.495*** 1.513***
(0.093) (0.095)
Perceived party differences -0.601*** -0.577***
(0.108) (0.110)
Vote t-1 1.125*** 1.103***
(0.115) (0.115)
Margin of the victory -0.318 -0.304*
(0.228) (0.163)
Average turnout older voters 6.148***
(1.099)
Constant 0.571*** 0.193 -0.097 -0.935*** -5.976***
(0.144) (0.167) (0.275) (0.329) (1.156)
Log-likelihood -7137.508 -7100.769 -7087.017 -6237.298 -6204.970
R2 0.025 0.031 0.033 0.150 0.155
N 10043 10043 10043 10043 10043
note: b coefficients from logit analyses with robust s.e.’s clustered by election in parentheses;
reference category is pre-war generation; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 1: Young adult turnout by maturation, BES 1964-2010
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model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5
b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se)
Age 0.399** 0.170 0.146 -0.249 0.008
(0.184) (0.178) (0.179) (0.184) (0.156)
Baby boom generation -0.104 -0.140 -0.992*** -0.860** -0.797*
(0.109) (0.110) (0.270) (0.427) (0.431)
Sixties generation -0.253 -0.330* -0.662*** -0.648* -0.538*
(0.185) (0.185) (0.257) (0.357) (0.320)
Seventies generation -0.738*** -0.798*** -1.014*** -0.485 -0.283
(0.213) (0.216) (0.346) (0.415) (0.307)
Post-seventies generation -1.024*** -1.107*** -1.191*** -0.718*** -0.082
(0.226) (0.260) (0.207) (0.272) (0.304)
Left education -0.835*** -1.214*** -1.044*** -1.075***
(0.159) (0.193) (0.250) (0.259)
Married/cohabiting 0.246*** 0.468*** 0.426** 0.380**
(0.090) (0.166) (0.188) (0.183)
Has child(ren) -0.024 -0.203* -0.218* -0.238*
(0.075) (0.116) (0.117) (0.123)
Home owner 0.520*** 0.428*** 0.367*** 0.371***
(0.084) (0.119) (0.124) (0.124)
Residential stability 0.229*** 0.244 0.294 0.293
(0.075) (0.192) (0.218) (0.219)
Works 0.166** 0.256* 0.230 0.212
(0.065) (0.139) (0.152) (0.152)
Left education * baby boom 1.063*** 1.029** 1.017**
(0.337) (0.449) (0.462)
Married * baby boom -0.432** -0.487* -0.457*
(0.200) (0.249) (0.243)
Child(ren) * baby boom 0.341** 0.331** 0.283*
(0.145) (0.161) (0.164)
Gender -0.150** -0.149**
(0.075) (0.074)
Educational level 0.581*** 0.566***
(0.136) (0.135)
Union membership 0.181* 0.174*
(0.095) (0.092)
Strength of party id 1.508*** 1.529***
(0.092) (0.096)
Perceived party differences -0.589*** -0.563***
(0.106) (0.109)
Vote t-1 1.114*** 1.093***
(0.115) (0.116)
Margin of the victory -0.363 -0.350**
(0.222) (0.152)
Average turnout >35 years 6.394***
(1.000)
Constant 0.571*** 0.861*** 1.171*** -0.061 -5.251***
(0.144) (0.154) (0.211) (0.311) (0.921)
Log-likelihood -7137.508 -7009.394 -6982.965 -6173.429 -6139.803
Pseudo R2 0.025 0.043 0.047 0.159 0.164
N 10043 10043 10043 10043 10043
note: b coefficients from logit analyses with robust s.e.’s clustered by election in parentheses;
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.0; reference category is pre-war generation; models include
all interactions between life-cycle events and the baby boom, sixties and seventies generations;
only interaction terms significant at the p<.05 level are shown because of space limitations.
Table 2: Young adult turnout by life-cycle events, BES 1964-2010
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Self-reported turnout (1 = yes) 10043 0,61 0,49 0 1
Age 10043 26,84 5,12 18 35
Maturation index (6 = mature) 10043 3,82 1,50 0 6
Left education (1 = yes) 10043 0,93 0,26 0 1
Married/cohabiting (1 = yes) 10043 0,58 0,49 0 1
Has child(ren) (1 = yes) 10043 0,48 0,50 0 1
Homeowner (1 = yes) 10043 0,54 0,50 0 1
Residential stability (1 = yes) 10043 0,60 0,49 0 1
Works (1 = yes) 10043 0,69 0,46 0 1
Gender (1 = male) 10043 0,50 0,50 0 1
Educational level (3 = high) 10043 2,10 0,60 1 3
Union membership (1 = yes) 10043 0,25 0,43 0 1
Strength of party id (3 = very strong) 10043 1,48 0,93 0 3
Perceived party differences (3 = not much) 10043 1,83 0,71 1 3
Voted previous election (1 = yes) 10043 0,59 0,49 0 1
Margin of the victory 10043 8,01 4,60 1 15
Average turnout older voters 10043 77,53 4,21 68 82
Table 3: Descriptive statistics all respondents
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Self-reported turnout (1 = yes) 1756 0,70 0,46 0 1
Age 1756 29,82 3,92 21 35
Maturation index (6 = mature) 1756 4,45 1,03 1 6
Left education (1 = yes) 1756 1,00 0,01 0 1
Married/cohabiting (1 = yes) 1756 0,84 0,37 0 1
Has child(ren) (1 = yes) 1756 0,71 0,45 0 1
Homeowner (1 = yes) 1756 0,49 0,50 0 1
Residential stability (1 = yes) 1756 0,71 0,45 0 1
Works (1 = yes) 1756 0,70 0,46 0 1
Gender (1 = male) 1756 0,49 0,50 0 1
Educational level (3 = high) 1756 1,69 0,72 1 3
Union membership (1 = yes) 1756 0,28 0,45 0 1
Strength of party id (3 = very strong) 1756 1,87 0,93 0 3
Perceived party differences (3 = not much) 1756 1,94 0,83 1 3
Voted previous election (1 = yes) 1756 0,67 0,47 0 1
Margin of the victory 1756 3,25 2,12 1 7
Average turnout older voters 1756 79,81 1,34 78 82
Table 4: Descriptive statistics pre-war generation (born <1945)
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Self-reported turnout (1 = yes) 3618 0,67 0,47 0 1
Age 3618 27,43 4,83 18 35
Maturation index (6 = mature) 3618 4,06 1,33 0 6
Left education (1 = yes) 3618 0,96 0,19 0 1
Married/cohabiting (1 = yes) 3618 0,67 0,47 0 1
Has child(ren) (1 = yes) 3618 0,57 0,50 0 1
Homeowner (1 = yes) 3618 0,56 0,50 0 1
Residential stability (1 = yes) 3618 0,59 0,49 0 1
Works (1 = yes) 3618 0,71 0,45 0 1
Gender (1 = male) 3618 0,49 0,50 0 1
Educational level (3 = high) 3618 2,26 0,56 1 3
Union membership (1 = yes) 3618 0,30 0,46 0 1
Strength of party id (3 = very strong) 3618 1,58 0,92 0 3
Perceived party differences (3 = not much) 3618 1,82 0,69 1 3
Voted previous election (1 = yes) 3618 0,65 0,48 0 1
Margin of the victory 3618 8,11 5,14 1 15
Average turnout older voters 3618 79,65 1,69 78 82
Table 5: Descriptive statistics baby boom generation (born 1945-1959)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Self-reported turnout (1 = yes) 2748 0,62 0,48 0 1
Age 2748 26,11 5,36 18 35
Maturation index (6 = mature) 2748 3,75 1,44 0 6
Left education (1 = yes) 2748 0,94 0,24 0 1
Married/cohabiting (1 = yes) 2748 0,48 0,50 0 1
Has child(ren) (1 = yes) 2748 0,37 0,48 0 1
Homeowner (1 = yes) 2748 0,61 0,49 0 1
Residential stability (1 = yes) 2748 0,62 0,49 0 1
Works (1 = yes) 2748 0,72 0,45 0 1
Gender (1 = male) 2748 0,51 0,50 0 1
Educational level (3 = high) 2748 2,16 0,52 1 3
Union membership (1 = yes) 2748 0,25 0,43 0 1
Strength of party id (3 = very strong) 2748 1,38 0,88 0 3
Perceived party differences (3 = not much) 2748 1,68 0,63 1 3
Voted previous election (1 = yes) 2748 0,63 0,48 0 1
Margin of the victory 2748 11,54 2,53 7 15
Average turnout older voters 2748 77,95 3,82 68 82
Table 6: Descriptive statistics sixties generation (born 1960-1969)
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Self-reported turnout (1 = yes) 1513 0,51 0,50 0 1
Age 1513 26,24 4,88 18 35
Maturation index (6 = mature) 1513 3,46 1,67 0 6
Left education (1 = yes) 1513 0,89 0,31 0 1
Married/cohabiting (1 = yes) 1513 0,46 0,50 0 1
Has child(ren) (1 = yes) 1513 0,34 0,47 0 1
Homeowner (1 = yes) 1513 0,54 0,50 0 1
Residential stability (1 = yes) 1513 0,56 0,50 0 1
Works (1 = yes) 1513 0,68 0,47 0 1
Gender (1 = male) 1513 0,50 0,50 0 1
Educational level (3 = high) 1513 2,12 0,50 1 3
Union membership (1 = yes) 1513 0,17 0,38 0 1
Strength of party id (3 = very strong) 1513 1,23 0,90 0 3
Perceived party differences (3 = not much) 1513 1,96 0,68 1 3
Voted previous election (1 = yes) 1513 0,47 0,50 0 1
Margin of the victory 1513 8,35 3,60 3 13
Average turnout older voters 1513 73,64 4,98 68 81
Table 7: Descriptive statistics seventies generation (born 1970-1979)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Self-reported turnout (1 = yes) 408 0,41 0,49 0 1
Age 408 21,92 3,28 18 30
Maturation index (6 = mature) 408 2,52 1,77 0 6
Left education (1 = yes) 408 0,72 0,45 0 1
Married/cohabiting (1 = yes) 408 0,26 0,44 0 1
Has child(ren) (1 = yes) 408 0,19 0,40 0 1
Homeowner (1 = yes) 408 0,35 0,48 0 1
Residential stability (1 = yes) 408 0,47 0,50 0 1
Works (1 = yes) 408 0,53 0,50 0 1
Gender (1 = male) 408 0,51 0,50 0 1
Educational level (3 = high) 408 2,06 0,43 1 3
Union membership (1 = yes) 408 0,10 0,30 0 1
Strength of party id (3 = very strong) 408 1,07 0,85 0 3
Perceived party differences (3 = not much) 408 1,94 0,70 1 3
Voted previous election (1 = yes) 408 0,30 0,46 0 1
Margin of the victory 408 5,85 2,43 3 9
Average turnout older voters 408 70,88 1,48 68 72
Table 8: Descriptive statistics post-seventies generation (born ≥ 1980)
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model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5
b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se)
Age 0.399** 0.170 0.154 -0.229 0.036
(0.184) (0.178) (0.182) (0.188) (0.157)
Baby boom generation -0.104 -0.140 -0.496* -0.508** -0.395*
(0.109) (0.110) (0.273) (0.214) (0.208)
Sixties generation -0.253 -0.330* -0.468 -0.477 -0.319
(0.185) (0.185) (0.402) (0.453) (0.445)
Seventies generation -0.738*** -0.798*** -0.950*** -0.632* -0.355
(0.213) (0.216) (0.330) (0.353) (0.353)
Post-seventies generation -1.024*** -1.107*** -1.138** -0.897* -0.185
(0.226) (0.260) (0.446) (0.492) (0.595)
Left education -0.835*** -0.833*** -0.709*** -0.719***
(0.159) (0.235) (0.262) (0.275)
Married/cohabiting 0.246*** 0.202** 0.125 0.129
(0.090) (0.090) (0.091) (0.089)
Has child(ren) -0.024 -0.065 -0.087 -0.126
(0.075) (0.097) (0.108) (0.109)
Home owner 0.520*** 0.478*** 0.328*** 0.323***
(0.084) (0.099) (0.093) (0.092)
Residential stability 0.229*** 0.187* 0.208** 0.219**
(0.075) (0.097) (0.093) (0.091)
Works 0.166** 0.132 0.046 0.037
(0.065) (0.096) (0.100) (0.100)
Maturation * Baby boom 0.513 0.549 0.451
(0.489) (0.402) (0.378)
Maturation * Sixties 0.176 0.486 0.513
(0.685) (0.678) (0.647)
Maturation * Seventies 0.200 0.297 0.573
(0.567) (0.540) (0.550)
Maturation * Postseventies -0.094 0.346 0.253
(0.600) (0.652) (0.672)
Gender -0.149* -0.148*
(0.077) (0.076)
Educational level 0.544*** 0.533***
(0.140) (0.137)
Union membership 0.176* 0.171*
(0.092) (0.089)
Strength of party id 1.518*** 1.539***
(0.090) (0.093)
Perceived party differences -0.577*** -0.552***
(0.103) (0.106)
Vote t-1 1.113*** 1.090***
(0.113) (0.114)
Margin of the victory -0.357 -0.347**
(0.225) (0.155)
Average turnout >35 years 6.481***
(1.022)
Constant 0.571*** 0.861*** 1.006*** -0.050 -5.372***
(0.144) (0.154) (0.366) (0.409) (1.129)
Log-likelihood -7137.508 -7009.394 -7006.383 -6195.254 -6159.942
Pseudo R2 0.025 0.043 0.044 0.156 0.161
N 10043 10043 10043 10043 10043
note: b coefficients from logit analyses with robust s.e.’s clustered by election in parentheses;
reference category is pre-war generation; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 9: Young adult turnout by life-cycle events with maturation index interactions,
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Appendix C - Intended for online publication
Handling missing data raises both conceptual difficulties and computational challenges. The
default way in which most statistical packages approach the missing values problem – through
listwise deletion or complete case analyses – can yield bias, is inefficient, and is therefore
considered unreliable. In general, two approaches to handling missing data are recommended
in the literature: maximum likelihood (ML) and multiple imputation (MI) (Schafer and
Graham, 2002; Raghunathan, 2004).
There are different types of missing data. Unit non-response occurs when the entire data
collection procedure fails because respondents e.g. refuse to participate. Item non-response
occurs when data are partially missing because a respondent e.g. did not answer all questions
in the survey. Although part of the missing data problem in this paper is due to item non-
response, the more pressing problem is that certain variables were not included in certain
waves of the British Election Studies. Using listwise deletion would cause the sample size to
vary considerably in the analyses presented. This renders comparison of results between the
models difficult.
Table 10 below lists all the variables used in the analyses of this paper, the ratio of
missing to valid answers, the percentage of missing values10,and the main reason for the lack
of data. If no reason is given, data are missing due to item non-response. The variable with
the largest percentage of missing values is residential stability, which was missing in 27.5%
of the cases.
variable missing/valid percentage of reason for
name value ratio missing values missingness
turnout 0/33737 0%
age 0/33737 0%
left education 203/33737 0.6%
married 29/33737 0%
has child(ren) 6915/33737 20.5% Not included in 1974 (feb), 1992
home ownership 2000/33737 5.9% Not included in 1966
residential stability 9264/33737 27.5% Not included in 1983, 1992; 1/2 sample in 2001
works 57/33737 0%
gender 0/33737 0%
educational level 897/33737 2.7%
union membership 3014/33737 8.9% Not included in 1966
pid strength 1656/33737 4.9%
voted in previous elections 4690/33737 13.9% Only posed to 1/6 of the sample in 2001
average turnout older voters 0/33737 0%
Table 10: Missing values of modelled variables
The percentage of missing values in the sample used is quite high for certain variables.
This calls for an imputation method with a high level of efficiency. Suppose x is a real value
10Ratio’s and percentages are calculated based on the whole sample rather than the subset of
young adults aged 35 years or less. The reason for this is that the average turnout of older citizens
is part of the model and missing values thus need to be imputed for all respondents.
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and xˆ an estimated value. While treating missing data in a sample we want to make sure that
the bias between estimated and the true values is small. Moreover, we want the variance
and standard deviation of the estimated values to be small. Bias and variance are often
combined into one measure called mean square error, which is the squared distance between
the estimated and the real values over repeated samples: (xˆ-x)2. The mean square error
is equal to the squared bias plus the variance. Bias, variance, and the mean error describe
the behaviour of an estimate. However, we also want to be confident about the measures of
uncertainty that we report and estimate the true x with a probability of a certain predefined
rate (Schafer and Graham, 2002, p. 149).
Multiple imputation (MI) is a method for handling missing data that solves the problem
of uncertainty that many single imputation methods face. MI replaces each missing value by
a list of m > 1 simulated values and as such produces m plausible alternative versions of the
complete data set. Each of the m data sets is estimated in the same fashion by a complete
data method. Estimates of parameters of interest are subsequently averaged to give a single
estimate. Standard errors are computed according to the ‘Rubin rules’ (see below), allowing
for between- and within-imputation components of variation in the parameter estimates.
MI does not need many rounds of estimation to reach a high level of efficiency. Rubin
(1987) developed with the following way to calculate the efficiency of an estimate based on
an m number of imputation (see equation 1):
eff = (1 + λ/m)−1 (1)
where the efficiency is a function of the rate of the missing information (λ) and the number
of imputations (m). For example, with 27.5% of missing information (as is the case with
residential stability), m= 5 imputations will yield results that are 100/(1 + .055) = 94.8%
efficient. A rule of thumb for selection of the number of imputation rounds is that the
confidence coefficient for the worst-case parameter (in this case residential stability) should
be at least 95% (Royston, 2004, p. 239). This means that in this particular case more than
five rounds of imputation are desirable. Six rounds of imputation yield an efficiency of 95.6%
for the residential stability variable. Therefore, m is set to six for the imputation procedure
used to handle missing data for the analyses in this paper. The ice command in Stata is
used to execute the multiple imputation process (see Royston, 2004, 2005a,b).
As mentioned above, multiple imputation creates a small number of data sets (in this case
six), each of which has the missing values suitably imputed. The next step is to analyze each
complete data set independently and summarize the results of these independent estimations.
Coefficients are simply averaged. Summarizing the standard errors requires a bit more work
(see equation 2 taken from Rubin (1987)):
s =
√
u¯m +
m+ 1
m
bm (2)
where u¯m is the mean of the standard error’s, and bm is the variance of the estimates across
the imputations. The micombine command in Stata combines the estimates from the m
analyses using Rubin’s rules (Royston, 2004, 2005a,b).
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